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2D BATTALION (AIRBORNE) 8TH CAVALRY 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) APO San Francisco, California 96490
7 March 1966 SUBJECT: After Action Report (25 February 1966 to 5 March 1966)
Our next mission was to block the enemy escape route, vicinity the SADDLE at BR 867809. At 1400 hours, the Company conducted an air assault on a landing zone, vicinity BR865823 and moved south along the ridgeline to the objective area, closing at dark. We established a blocking position covering the entire main and side trails in the SADDLE, and placed a platoon size ambush at BR 868811. The next day, 26 February 1966, I decided to move the company down on the eastern side of the SADDLE to vicinity coordinates BR 868807, in order to establish a new and better sited ambush position. This new ambush position was secured at 1100 hours. At 1500 hours I was ordered to occupy the SADDLE again and at 1600 hours the Company was re-established in a blocking position in the SADDLE, and one platoon established an ambush at BR 873806 for the night. During the night one Viet Cong surrendered to the ambush force. He was armed with a light machine gun. On 27 February 1966, I was given the mission to find and capture a suspected enemy hospital somewhere in the ravine, vicinity BR 862813. In order to cover a larger area I moved one platoon down the ravine on the southwest slope and started moving the Company (-) down the main ridgeline above the ravine. At 1300 hours I discovered that the Company was moving too far to the southwest, so I began movement back to the North to get back into the area of the suspected hospital. Just prior to this the lead platoon (2nd) spotted 2 Viet Cong that appeared to be getting ready to climb a tree. They opened fire and killed one, and the other escaped. Shortly after this we spotted another Viet Cong and fired on him, missed, and then tried to run him down, to no avail. We then began to move north, following a small but recently used trail and at approximately 1500 hours the point squad was fired upon by one sniper, and at least one or possibly two machine guns located at vicinity BR 358812. The lead platoon returned fire and Lt. Stango began to maneuver part of his platoon. At this time, I was contacted by a scout ship of the 1/9 Cav, (that is a rocket ship available for support). We threw smoke and I directed the 1/9 Cav rocket ship to fire into the Viet Cong firing position. The 1/9 Cav put their rockets dead into the area from which we received the fire. Following this the Artillery Forward Observer called in and directed the fire of two AAA ships. After that we began to maneuver around to our right in order to out-flank the enemy positions while the Forward Observer called in 105 Artillery fire. While maneuvering around to the right, the 1st Platoon discovered the hospital area. At this time I moved the remainder of the company to the hospital area. It was a large area, so I had the 1st and 2nd Platoons spread out on line and move forward and up the hill to search the area out, and had the 3rd Platoon establish rear and flank security. As the 1st Platoon moved up the hill they were suddenly fired upon from well-concealed bunkers approximately 20 to 40 meters to their front. The enemy force estimated to be at approximately 20 to 30 meters, were personnel armed with two machine guns and rifles, and were also throwing dozens of concussions type hand grenades. Upon recommendation from Lt. Stango who could see the enemy position, I began to maneuver the 3rd Platoon around to his left and the 2nd Platoon right in order to get the 3rd Platoon behind and on the flank to the enemy. As the 3rd Platoon moved around to the right they began receiving a heavy volume of fire from more concealed bunkers on our right flank. At this time I called for a CS grenade drop, which arrived between 1730 and 1800 hours. The CS grenades and our own small area fire kept the enemy fire down to a minimum. Due to the lateness of the day and the fact that I could not make a complete evaluation of the enemy positions, I decided to pull back and establish a perimeter for the night. I moved the 2nd Platoon back across the ravine into a covering position as the 1st and 3rd Platoons disengaged under the cover of smoke. Then as we moved to our next position the Forward Observer called in Artillery fire on the enemy positions. We continued to move to a position approximately 400 meters to the east of the hospital area and secured a small landing zone from which our one wounded man was evacuated by the UH1D at approximately 2230 hours. The next day, 25 February 1966, we moved back toward the hospital at 0300 hours. En-route the point squad discovered a 12.7 mm A/A MG, complete, and several cans of ammo for the gun. This was brought back to and evacuated from the landing zone by UH1D. When we were in an attack position about 100 meters from the hospital area the Forward Observer started directing fire into the area and we moved forward as the artillery shelled the enemy area. This time we attacked the area from the east and northeast, instead of from the southeast, hoping to hit the enemy on the flank. The 2nd and 3rd Platoons moved forward and started up the hill. The platoons were abreast and well spread out. I had the 1st Platoon stay to the rear for rear and flank security. About 75 meters up the hill on which the enemy had been located the day before, the 3rd Platoon made contact with several well dug in Viet Cong. I was able to observe this platoon as they moved in on the Viet Cong. One squad would place a heavy volume of fire on the Viet Cong positions while another squad moved forward to where they could throw grenades, or fire their M-79's or LAWs, into the enemy positions. In this manner, the 2nd and 3rd Platoons cleared to the top of the hill, which was about 200 meters from bottom to top. I then moved the 1st Platoon further south and had the 3rd Platoon move down the side of the hill where the enemy had been the day before, but they only found 2 wounded Viet Cong (from an earlier ambush) hiding in the bunker. We discovered about a dozen 1' x 1' x 1-1/2' tins of medical and surgical equipment, plus a few hundred pounds of miscellaneous clothing. The company killed (body count) 12 Viet Cong while taking the hill. The company (-) then moved west down off the hill and closed back to position CUFF (BR 850812) at 1800 hours. The 2nd Platoon remained on the hill and prepared a landing zone from which they and the 2 wounded Viet Cong captives were extracted by UH1D at 1300 hours. On 1 March 1966 we made an air assault using 20 UH1D from CUFF to a landing zone, vicinity BR 934870, and moved north and then established a blocking position, vicinity BR974888, to prevent the enemy from escaping by way of the ocean. At 1715 hours we were picked up and moved by UH1D to BR 965870 and established another blocking position facing northeast, vicinity BR970873. During the night 2 personnel approached the 2nd Platoon's area in a suspicious manner and were fired upon, wounded, and captured, and subsequently air evacuated. On 2 March 1966 the company conducted a search and destroy operation from the above location to BR 953878 to 953895 to 959901. We found very little evidence of enemy activity in the area. We were then air lifted back to the previous night's location and again established a blocking position. On 3 March 1966 we moved on foot to and established a blocking position facing north from BR 933870 to 943863 to 950868, in order to prevent the escape of the enemy as Company B and Company C swept toward us from the north. We had no enemy contact, however. The 3 district representatives asked us to apprehend 2 Vietnamese men in the village at BR949863 as Viet Cong suspects, which we did and turned them over to Battalion S-2. At approximately 1630 hours we were air lifted back to BR955870, where we established a defense in our assigned portion of the Battalion perimeter. On 4 March, 1965, Company A conducted an air assault by "Trooper Ladder" from 4 - CH 47's on the SADDLE at BR931949, and then conducted a search and destroy operation on the east side of the ridge line running from BR 927951 to 922975. We found evidence that the entire area had been used at one time as a large supply storage area, but had not been used for several months. We made one contact, when 3 Viet Cong walked into our flank, as we were moving at BR 927951. One of the Viet Cong attempted to throw a grenade, but our flank security fired on them first and they fled. The Viet Cong were pursued, but escaped into extremely thick underbrush and could not be found. We moved to and established a night defensive position at BR 944984, with an ambush located at 944980. On 5 March 1966 we were picked up by 3 CH-47's and returned to the Division Base at An Khe, closing in at 0300 hours. THOMAS A
FORMAN
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